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Abstract 
The recent U.S. consumption boom and the subsequent surge in mortgage defaults have been 
linked  to  mortgage  equity  withdrawals  (MEWs).    MEWs  are  correlated  with  covariates 
consistent with a permanent income framework augmented for credit-constraints.  Nevertheless, 
many households are financially illiterate.  We assess the unexplored linkages between “active 
MEW” and measures of financial literacy using panel data from the Health and Retirement Study 
(HRS).  Findings  indicate  that  declines  in  mortgage  interest  rates  encouraged  MEWs.  
Nevertheless,  financially  illiterate  households  were  significantly  more  likely  to  withdraw 
housing  equity  via  traditional  first  or  second  mortgages  (including  cash-out  mortgage 
refinancings  but  not  home  equity  loans).  We  find  that  the  financially  less  savvy  are  3-5 
percentage points more likely to engage in this type of MEW relative to those who answered 
financial literacy questions correctly. Also significant were state differences in debtor versus 
creditor interests in bankruptcy, with loan demand effects outweighing loan supply effects across 
states.    
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  Mortgage equity withdrawals (MEWs) have been linked to the UK consumption boom of 
the late 1980s (Miles, 1992, and Muellbauer and Murphy, 1997) and the U.S. consumption boom 
of the early 2000s (Aron et al., 2011, Greenspan and Kennedy, 2008, and Hurst and Stafford, 
2004).  At the macro-level, MEW has been linked to an increased sensitivity of consumption to 
housing wealth (Duca, 2006, and Carroll, Otsuka, and Slacelek, 2011).  At the micro level, 
MEWs are correlated with liquidity constraints (Benito, 2009, and Browning et al., 2008, Hurst 
and Stafford, 2004), consistent with permanent-income models incorporating credit constraints, 
which imply that housing wealth influences consumption by providing collateral for loans to 
otherwise credit-constrained families (Englehardt, 1996, and Muellbauer and Lattimore, 1995). 
  However, the recent mortgage bust suggests that some households were not aware of the 
risks they took, consistent with evidence that many are not financially literate and that some 
withdrew housing equity via refinancing even when their mortgage rates rose.  Using data on a 
subset of middle and older age households in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), Lusardi 
and  Mitchell  (2007)  document  that  many  families  incorrectly  answered  questions  about 
compound interest, money illusion, and portfolio diversification.  Furthermore, incorrect answers 
have been linked to sub-optimal saving for retirements (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007) and over-
borrowing (Lusardi and Tufano, 2009).  Van Rooij, Lusardi and Alessi (2011) find that financial 
sophistication had a significant impact on stock market participation.  Bernheim, Garrett and 
Maki (2000) found evidence of positive role of high school financial education mandates in 
enhancing financial knowledge and that financial literacy has an important effect on subsequent 
wealth accumulation. In another paper, Bernheim and Garrett (2003) found that employer-based 
financial education programs are effective in raising saving.  In addition, there is also evidence 
that many home-owners do not choose the lowest cost home purchase mortgage because they 2 
 
may  be  confused  by  terms  in  the  mortgage  contract  (Woodward  and  Hall,  2010).  Evidence 
indicates that mistaken beliefs had a role in the consumption boom of the early- to mid-2000s.  In 
particular, Agarwal (2007) found that households who overestimated the market values of their 
homes had higher consumption and lower savings than those who did not. 
Nevertheless, the literature has not examined the links between financial literacy and 
MEW behavior which has implications for whether financial illiteracy may have helped fuel debt 
and  consumption  growth  before  the  recent  housing  bust.  This  study  addresses  this  gap  by 
examining  whether  answers  to  financial  literacy  questions  are  linked  to  which  homeowners 
withdraw  housing  equity.    To  control  for  non-literacy  influences  on  MEW,  we  include  a 
comprehensive set of households’ economic and demographic characteristics, individual gains 
from  refinancing,  home  price  appreciation  and  aspects  of  state  bankruptcy  laws.    Previous 
research  has  highlighted  significant  differences  between  the  effects  of  variables  related  to 
cognitive ability, numerical ability and other measures of financial literacy (Cole and Shastry, 
2009). To test for differential impact of various measures of financial literacy, we include three 
different measures of financial literacy in our estimated model of MEW—compound interest, 
money illusion, and portfolio diversification–and find that knowledge of the benefits of portfolio 
diversification has the most significant impact on the propensity to engage in MEW.  
Our results indicate that the financially literate are significantly less likely to withdraw 
housing equity via increasing mortgage debt, although, we find no significant differences in 
MEW  through  tapping  home  equity  lines  of  credit  (HELOC).  Results  from  our  richest 
specification suggest that the financially literate are 5 percentage points less likely to withdraw 
equity from their homes. Consistent with the limited literature on MEWs, we also find that the 
propensity for withdrawing housing equity rises with house price appreciation and incentives to 3 
 
lower mortgage interest rates.  In line with Lefgren and McIntyre’s (2009) findings that state 
variation in legal codes affects bankruptcy rates, we also find that differences in debtor legal 
conditions across states are correlated with MEW behavior, suggesting that legal differences 
affect the cross-regional supply of and demand for consumer versus real-estate-secured debt.  
Moreover, in the presence of a variable controlling for legal differences across states, stronger 
effects of cross-state and cross-time differences in house price appreciation emerge.  
We address the fact that financial literacy could be endogenous as it may be correlated 
with individual specific risk preferences which also affect the propensity to withdraw mortgage 
equity.  We  use  HRS  survey-based  measures  of  risk  aversion  to  account  for  systematic 
differences in risk preferences which may bias our estimates of the impact of financial literacy 
on mortgage equity withdrawal. The estimated impact of financial literacy on MEW propensity 
from our baseline model  increases from -3 percentage points to -5 percentage points—when we 
control for risk aversion, suggesting that the more financially savvy are also less risk averse. This 
is  consistent  with  recent  findings  that  cognitive  ability  is  inversely  related  to  risk  aversion 
(Dohmen et al., 2010).  Our findings are robust to including year and state fixed effects and to 
the use of nonparametric matching methods to estimate average treatment effects.  
Our results have implications for the effectiveness of financial education programs that 
could help households make better financial decisions. There is evidence that MEW is correlated 
with mortgage delinquencies as the housing bubble unraveled. Sufi and Mian (2010) find that the 
surge in MEW can account for as much 40 percent of new mortgage defaults between 2006 and 
2008. Even in cases not resulting in default or delinquency, higher borrowing by the ill-informed 
can lower future consumption during a housing bust via lowering their net liquid assets (see 
Aron et al., 2011).  Such over-borrowing also increases the probability that a negative house 4 
 
price shock could push a borrower into a negative net housing equity position, which, in turn, 
reduces  its  labor  market  mobility  (see  Ferreira  et  al.,  2010).    Thus  a  negative  relationship 
between  financial  literacy  and  MEW  propensity  suggests  that  financial  education  programs 
might lower mortgage default rates and other negative consequences of high borrowing.   
  To present these findings, this study is organized as follows.  Section II lays out the basic 
empirical specification which is based on theoretical factors affecting the propensity to withdraw 
housing equity.  The third section presents the data and variables used.  The fourth section 
provides estimation findings and some robustness checks, and the conclusion summarizes some 
possible implications for household behavior and public policy regarding consumer protection. 
II. Basic Model Specification and Estimation Details 
Let      denote the unobservable gain to the household from refinancing to withdraw 
mortgage  equity  and  let       be  an  indicator  variable  equaling  1  if        0   and  zero 
otherwise. We then model the probability of refinancing to withdraw mortgage equity as: 
             1    Φ                                         HomeApprec    
                                                                      1 3                                   
(1)
where  ,  , and   index households, year, and state of residence, respectively.       is a dummy 
variable for whether the respondent is financially literate.              measures how much 
refinancing lowers the mortgage payment, equal to gap between new and the average existing 
mortgage interest rate multiplied by household i’s mortgage principal. HomeApprec   is the 
state level three year average annual price appreciation.          and        13  are state 
level legal variables that may be correlated with the incentive to withdraw equity. Unemp, a 0-1 
variable for whether the respondent was unemployed in the prior two years, allows us to account 
for the role of liquidity constraints on mortgage equity withdrawal.   is a vector of demographic 
variables such as age, sex, race, education, marital status, number of children in the household, 5 
 
permanent income, liquid wealth, loan-to-value ratio, and risk preferences, which may influence 
the propensity to withdraw mortgage equity.    is an individual-specific unobserved effect and 
    is an error term that varies both with individuals and time, Φ .  is the standard normal CDF. 
Assuming a standard normal distribution for the composite error term,              , gives rise to 
the standard Probit model for estimating the probability of withdrawing mortgage equity. 
  The gross time series MEW estimates of  Greenspan  and  Kennedy  (2008)  have  three 
major components: MEWs arising from the turnover of homes sold, the tapping of home equity 
lines or borrowing from a new second or third lien mortgage, and cash-out mortgage refinancing.  
Our binary measure of MEW is based on home-owners who have not moved, and essentially is 
based on the second and third MEW components for the households in our HRS sample. This 
gauge of “active MEW” is viewed as a deliberate form of borrowing that empirically is more 
closely linked to consumer spending (Greenspan and Kennedy, 2008).     
Controlling for the incentives to refinance is important in our Probit model because, by 
the late 1990s, refinancing mortgages became a major component of active MEW (see Figure 1 
and Greenspan and Kennedy, 2008).  If mortgage interest rates fall enough to overcome fixed 
costs to warrant refinancing, then refinancing also offers one the ability to withdraw equity from 
housing at little marginal cost and at tax-favored and low-collateralized interest rates.  In this 
sense, decisions to refinance or conduct an MEW can often be a linked decision for a household 
wishing to borrow or to draw down its portfolio stake in housing.  One advantage of conducting 
a  cash-out  refinancing  over  borrowing  through  a  home  equity  line,  is  that  the  former  give 
homeowners the ability to lock in low, long-term interest rates on MEWs.  By contrast, home 
equity loans either have a variable interest rate, or if they have a fixed interest rate, it is usually 
above the rate on first-lien mortgages owing to the lower value of collateral on second liens.  6 
 
Because of these considerations, the incentives to refinance mortgages may affect the marginal 
decisions to conduct an MEW.  Accordingly, we include             in the Probit specification. 
 
III. Data and Variables 
Defining who withdrew mortgage equity 
Our  main  data  source  is  the  Health  and  Retirement  Survey  (HRS),  a  representative 
sample  of  U.S.  population  age  50  and  over.    We  then  use  a  random  subsample  of  HRS 
respondents who were selected to answer an additional three financial literacy questions in 2004.  
From these, we focus on homeowners who remained in their 1998 homes across five semi-
annual  HRS  surveys  conducted  between  1998  and  2006.
1    We  defined  a  household  as 
                                                      
1 1266 respondents were asked one of the financial literacy questions in 2004 yielding 4232  respondent years, after 
imputing the 2004 response for each respondent to all years the sample. 74% of these are homeowners and 92% of 
the homeowners did not buy or sell a house, leaving us with 2706 observations. After dropped observations due to 
















Figure 1: Cash-OutRefinancings Have Been
a Large Component of "Active MEW"
$ billions per 
quarter, NSA
Source: updated data based on Greenspan andKennedy (2008).  Free cash extracted from these two components is roughly equal to "Active 
MEW" with some minor differences.7 
 
withdrawing equity from their homes if their reported outstanding mortgage debt rose from one 
survey to the next (if so MEW =1, and 0 otherwise).
2  Effectively, MEW activity can occur if the 
household borrowed during a two-year interval using a home equity loan, another type of second 
or third mortgage, or refinanced their old mortgage debt into a larger new mortgage (a “cash-out” 
mortgage refinancing).  We restrict our measures of MEW to where mortgage debt rose without 
or with the use of home equity lines of credit (HELOC’s) for reasons discussed later.   
Demographic and Educational Background Control Variables 
  Each Probit model includes a baseline set of control variables.  Demographic controls 
include the age of the respondent (Age), and 0-1 variables for whether the respondent is white 
(White), male (Male) and married (Married).  If loan demand or acceptance of new financial 
products is declining in age, Age could have a negative sign.  If households with older or white 
members  face  less  binding  credit  constraints  on  consumer  loans  (e.g.,  Duca  and  Rosenthal, 
1993), their demand to withdraw housing equity would be lower.  We also include the number of 
children  living  in  the  household  (NumChildren),  which  likely  has  a  positive  effect  if  larger 
families have higher debt demand or are more likely to face binding size limits on consumer 
loans.  Unemp could have a positive sign if a consumption-smoothing boost to loan demand from 
unemployment outweighs any decline in loan supply to the unemployed.  Because we assess the 
role of financial literacy rather than general educational background, we include a common set of 
0-1  variables  for  whether  the  respondent  only  graduated  from  high  school  (HSchoolGrad), 
graduated from college (CollegeGrad) or graduated from high school but only attended college 
without graduating (SomeCollege). Summary statistics are in Table 1. 
Variables Controlling for Financial Condition 
                                                      
2 There was no difference in the sample if the threshold for an MEW were a $1 or $1,000 rise in mortgage debt. 8 
 
Research has found that the liquidity constrained are more likely to tap home equity 
(Hurst and Stafford, 2004). Such households may also face differential costs of maintaining 
financial literacy. Therefore most models include two proxies for liquidity constraints: whether 
the respondent is unemployed (Unemp) and its lagged liquid assets (LaggedLiquidAssets). To 
account for permanent income, we calculate the average total household income over all the 
years in the sample (MeanIncome). Because MEW may depend on how much a respondent has 
already leveraged their home, we also include lagged loan-to-value ratio (LaggedLTV). 
Measuring Financial Literacy 
  A key variable in equation (1) is      , a measure of financial literacy of the respondent. 
To gauge financial literacy, we used several 0-1 variables measuring if a household correctly 
answered a financial literacy question (=1 if correct, 0 otherwise).  One question (LitCompound) 
asked whether one would have more than, equal to, or less than $1.02 in a deposit account after 
three years if one originally deposited $1 and earned an annual deposit rate of 2 percent.  Correct 
answers likely reflect  numeracy.  Another question (LitMonIllus) asked whether one could buy 
more of, the same, or less than a given basket of goods if one bought them today with $100, or if 
one waited a year, during which the inflation rate equaled 2 percent and the $100 were put in a 
bank deposit earning 1 percent annual interest.  Correct answers likely reflect literacy in the 
sense of numeracy and understanding money illusion.  The third question (LitPortRisk) asked 
whether it were safer to invest in a stock mutual fund or an individual company’s stock.  Correct 
answers to this question likely reflect a basic understanding of portfolio diversification.  Only 34 
percent correctly answered all three questions, with 69, 78, and 55 percent, correctly answering 
the compound interest, money illusion, and portfolio diversification questions, respectively. We 
classified those who did not answer a particular question with those who incorrectly answered as 9 
 
financially illiterate.  Coefficient estimates were similar dropping those not answering from the 
sample, with standard errors larger owing to fewer degrees of freedom.  
Standard MEW Supply and Demand Variables and Control Variables 
Following  Benito  (2008)  we  control  for  standard  MEW  factors  and other  influences.  
Several reflect the reduced-form effects of loan supply and demand factors that work in the same 
(e.g., house price appreciation) or opposite (regional variation in the rights of debtors versus 
creditors) direction.  If whites are less liquidity constrained from having more inherited wealth or 
face easier constraints for non-secured credit than nonwhites, the coefficient on White would 
reflect positively signed loan demand and loan supply effects.  Other variables primarily reflect 
demand factors.  Nevertheless, if some demographic variables and the unemployment dummy 
are also correlated with credit constraints, there may be some oppositely signed loan supply and 
demand effects.  This implies that some estimated coefficients reflect the net effect of oppositely 
or  ambiguously  signed  loan  demand  versus  loan  supply.    For  example,  lower  income  from 
unemployment might lower loan demand or increase the desperation need to tap housing wealth 
to smooth consumption, whereas loan supply will likely be reduced.  We find a positive, but 
statistically insignificant sign on the 0-1 variable for being unemployed over the prior two years.   
Mortgage Interest Rate Incentives to Refinance 
  Homeowners who do not sell their homes can withdraw housing equity by taking out a 
second mortgage or refinancing their old mortgage with a larger loan.  Owing to the transactions 
costs of refinancing, the incentive to withdraw housing equity is enhanced if borrowers benefit 
from refinancing mortgages at lower interest rates.  To control for the latter, we include the 
product of an individual’s mortgage debt in the prior survey and maximum quarterly interest rate 
gap, defined as the average interest rate on outstanding mortgages minus the interest rate on new 10 
 
mortgages, RefIncent.
3  The higher the ratio, the more advantageous it is to refinance a mortgage 
and to withdraw housing equity via mortgage refinancing.  We interacted this variable with 
different measures of financial literacy to test whether the financially literate are more likely to 
withdraw housing equity when refinancing entailed switching to a lower mortgage interest rate.   
Freddie  Mac  data  reveal  there  are  periods  when  the  average  refinancing  homeowner 
replaces a lower interest rate mortgage with one having a higher interest rate and larger principal 
balance.  This pattern suggests a role for credit constraints since households can usually borrow 
against home equity at a lower interest rate than on unsecured loans. So even if a mortgage 
refinancing raises the interest rate on the owner’s prior mortgage balance, it may be their lowest 
interest rate option for new borrowing.   Another rational interpretation of borrowers replacing 
lower with higher interest rate mortgages is that they may be switching from adjustable-rate 
mortgage to a higher, but more stable, fixed rate mortgages.  An alternative explanation is that 
financial illiterate borrowers might mistake the lower mortgage payments from lengthening the 
maturity of mortgages for the true cost of the mortgage rather than the higher interest rate.  A 
related possibility is that the financially illiterate may not adequately consider the higher cost of 
refinancing their mortgages when withdrawing housing equity.  These last two alternatives imply 
that the financially illiterate are more likely than the literate to withdraw housing equity.  
House Price Appreciation 
  House  price  appreciation  raises  loan  supply,  reflecting  greater  collateral,  and  loan 
demand, reflecting a greater ability to smooth consumption or rebalance asset portfolios.  To 
control for house price appreciation, we included the annualized real appreciation rate of house 
prices over the three years preceding each HRS survey using state FHFA house price indexes 
deflated by the personal consumption expenditures deflator (HomeApprec).   
                                                      
3 Not knowing the horizons of homeowners, we could not calculate present values, as in Hurst and Stafford (2004).   11 
 
Cross-State Differences in Bankruptcy and Default Laws 
  Recent literature examines the links between cross-state variation in lending laws and 
loan quality.  Based on variables used by Lehnert and Maki (2007) and Lefgren and McIntyre 
(2009),  we  control  for  differences  in  laws  about  what  portion  of  a  bankrupt  borrower’s  (1) 
income is shielded from garnishment (Garnish) and (2) what percent of real estate assets are 
shielded by homestead exemptions from nonmortgage lenders (Homestead, scaled as a percent of 
median existing house prices, National Association of Realtors).
4  Using another data source,
5 we 
also control for whether (3) lenders need to file a lawsuit to start the foreclosure process (Judicial 
= 1 if only judicial proceedings allowed, .5 if nonjudicial and judicial are allowed, and 0 if only 
or predominantly nonjudicial) or (4) mortgage lenders have access to other borrower assets or 
income if there is a shortfall between the principal (plus fees) and the net value of real estate 
collateral collected on a repossessed home (Deficiency=1 if allowed, 0 if not or impractical).  
In principle, such variables affect loan supply and loan demand, sometimes in opposite 
directions.  For example, the higher the share of income exempt from garnishment (Garnish),
6 
the  more  willing  lenders  are  to  supply  real-estate  secured  loans  relative  to  other  forms  of 
consumer credit.  The reason is that unsecured consumer credit lenders have less recourse to a 
bankrupt borrower’s future income, while mortgage lenders can repossess a home.  This effect 
on the relative loan supply of loans could be offset if a higher share of income shielded from 
garnishment  dissuades  lenders  from  supplying  credit  to  denizens  of  a  state,  resulting  in  a 
                                                      
4 We use data from Legal Consumer  (http://www.legalconsumer.com/bankruptcy/laws/) on bankruptcy exemptions 
for nonfarm property for married or joint owners on standard residential homes (not mobile homes), excluding any 
extra exemptions for disabled, elderly, or mentally ill people.  The exemption used also assumes that a family 
contains two minor children (minors affect the size of the bankruptcy exemption in Maine, Tennessee, and Virginia). 
5 Source: All Foreclosure, http://www.all-foreclosure.com/procedures.htm.  For missing data on South Dakota, state 
laws indicated that deficiencies are allowed and that there is a mix of judicial and non-judicial proceedings. 
6 Most states follow federal laws making 25% of disposable income subject to garnishment.  Some states set lower 
percentage limits.  Where state guidelines exempt “living expenses,” we multiply the share subject to garnishment 
by 50% to adjust for living expenses.  In states shielding a nominal weekly amount of income, we annualize income 
and tdivide by 1999 state median family income downward by 25% to convert income into an after-tax equivalent.  12 
 
negative  effect  of  garnishment.    The  impacts  of  such  considerations  on  loan  demand  are 
oppositely signed.  Greater shielding from garnishment tends to boost loan demand, while giving 
borrowers more of an incentive to substitute unsecured loans for collateralized loans.     
Withdrawing home equity should theoretically be increasing in the share of real estate 
assets shielded in bankruptcy from a nonmortgage lender (Homestead).  The reason is that a 
nonmortgage lender has less recourse to a bankrupt’s real estate assets, while mortgage lenders 
can still repossess a home.  In theory, by raising the costs of collecting on delinquent mortgages, 
Judicial  should  be  negatively  related  to  lenders  willingness  to  allow  borrowers  to  withdraw 
housing equity. In contrast, by enabling mortgage lenders to collect more than collateral in the 
case of default, Deficiency should be positively (negatively) related with the propensity to make 
an MEW if loan supply effects outweigh (are outweighed by) loan demand effects.  Variables 
like Homestead, Judicial, and Deficiency have been statistically insignificant in accounting for 
cross-state variation in loan quality, in contrast to variables accounting for garnishment or the 
relative use of chapter 13 versus chapter 7 bankruptcy (Lefgren and McIntyre, 2009).   
State “legal cultures” can differ insofar as differences in legal precedents and formal legal 
restrictions and regulations favor the use of Chapter 13 bankruptcy over Chapter 7 bankruptcy.  
If a borrower files under Chapter 7, they allow all non-shielded assets (pensions and homestead-
protected real estate are exempt) to be liquidated to settle their debts.  If they file under Chapter 
13, they commit to making negotiated loan payments over the next 3-5 years without having to 
liquidate unshielded assets.  Garnishments (direct deductions from a borrower’s paycheck to the 
lender) are still subject to state limits.  If a borrower does not meet Chapter 13 commitments, the 
lender can start a new bankruptcy proceeding.  Chapter 13 generally is seen as less advantageous 
to lenders and allows borrower attorneys to collect higher fees that lower net payouts to lenders.  13 
 
Of these legal variables, Lefgren and McIntyre (2009) find that only the garnishment (Garnish) 
and the Chapter 13 share of bankruptcy filings (Chap13Share) were statistically significant, with 
both having a positive correlation with cross-state variation in the rate of bankruptcy filings, and 
Garnish explaining an economically significant portion of cross-state variation.  Largely in line 
with this result, we find that the only significant legal variables are Garnish and Chap13Share.  
IV. Estimation Results 
We  estimate  Probit  models  of  nonHELOC  MEWs  that  all  include  a  basic  set  of 
demographic  and  background  variables,  but  differ  as  to  whether  they  include  variables  for 
financial literacy, controls for liquidity controls, permanent income, loan-to-value ratio, and legal 
differences  across  states,  year  and  state  fixed  effects.  Due  to  the  lack  of  time  variation  in 
financial literacy we are not able to estimate models with individual specific fixed effects to 
control for any unobserved heterogeneity correlated with financial literacy or other variables as 
well as with MEW propensity. We start by assuming that, conditional on other covariates in 
equation (1),         and other right hand side variables are uncorrelated with both α  and e  .  
Because  errors  may  be  correlated  across  years  for  the  same  unit  owing  to  the  presence 
of unobserved effects    ,, all standard errors are clustered at the respondent level.   Table 2 
reports  findings  from  eight  models..    The  baseline  model  (Column  1)  includes  family 
demographic variables, key variables capturing the incentive to refinance i.e., RefIncent, and 
HomeApprec.  The last two have statistically significant positive coefficients, implying that there 
was a greater propensity to tap housing equity via MEWs among those having greater interest 
rate incentives to refinance and who lived in states with faster house price appreciation.  In the 
baseline model, there are only three other variables that are statistically significant, with older 
and white households having a significantly lower propensity to withdraw housing equity and 14 
 
with the number of children positively affecting that propensity.  Loan demand is likely to be 
less among the first two of those three categories, while unsecured loan supply could be greater 
if whites face easier credit constraints, consistent with Duca and Rosenthal (1993).  For these 
reasons,  the  coefficients  on  these  variables  are  loosely  consistent  with  the  view  that  credit 
constrained households are more likely to withdraw housing equity because empirically younger, 
nonwhite, and larger families have a greater likelihood of being credit constrained.   
  To estimate the impact of financial literacy on MEW propensity, Column 2 adds the three 
financial literacy variables to Column 1.  Of these, only LitPortRisk was statistically significant, 
indicating  a  lower  MEW  propensity  for  those  having some portfolio literacy. The estimated 
marginal  effect  of  -0.037  implies  that  those  who  answered  LitPortRisk  correctly  are  3.7 
percentage points less likely to withdraw mortgage equity relative to those who either answered 
incorrectly  or  did  not  know.  The  remaining  columns,  therefore,  drop  the  two  insignificant 
measures of financial literacy. Dropping the alternative measures of financial literacy in Column 
3 has minimal impact on the estimated impact of LitPortRisk on propensity to withdraw equity. 
To capture the impact of liquidity constraints on MEW, Column 4 controls for whether 
the respondent is unemployed (Unemp) and includes lagged liquid assets (LaggedLiquidAssets) 
The positive sign on the unemployment dummy suggests that the increased loan demand effects 
associated with smoothing consumption have positive credit constraint effects on the likelihood 
of  conducting  an  MEW  that  outweigh  any  negative  effects  of  loan  supply  or  loan  demand 
associated with job loss. The negative and significant sign on lagged liquid assets confirms that 
liquidity constraints are a key driver of propensity to withdraw equity.  Column 5 enriches the 
model  to  include  mean  household  income  (MeanIncome)  and  lagged  loan-to-value  ratio 
(LaggedLTV), which does not qualitatively change the estimated impact of financial literacy.  15 
 
Several legal variables were added to the model in Column 6, and a model selection 
procedure was used to progressively omit the most insignificant legal variable.  In the end, only 
Chap13Share  and  Garnish  were  at  least  marginally  significant.    In  particular,  there  was  a 
statistically significant greater MEW propensity in states whose legal environment induced the 
use of Chapter 13 over Chapter 7 bankruptcy and a marginally significant higher propensity in 
states protecting a higher share of household income from garnishment.  This suggests that the 
positive loan demand effects of legal codes favoring debtors outweighed the impact of their 
negative loan supply effects.  The apparent weaker effects on loan supply may reflect that some 
lenders underestimated the downside risk of new mortgage products in the recent housing boom 
(Duca,  Muellbauer,  and  Murphy,  2010).    The  only  notable  effect  from  including  the  legal 
variables is that the house price appreciation coefficient is larger and more significant.  The 
estimated impact of financial literacy on MEW propensity is significant and remarkably stable 
across Columns 1-6 in Table 1, indicating that the financially literate are about 3 percentage 
points less likely to withdraw equity via refinancing or using traditional second mortgages. 
The decision to withdraw equity using traditional first or second mortgages may operate 
differently from tapping home equity lines of credit (HELOC’s). HELOC borrowers have been 
found to differ in many respects, tending to be wealthier and own more expensive homes. A 
possible reason is that HELOCs tend to be held in portfolio, giving lenders more incentive to use 
tighter  credit  standards  than  on  traditional  mortgages  which  are  more  often  securitized. 
Therefore,  in  Column  7  of  Table  2,  we  explore  whether  the  financially  literate  exhibit  any 
systematic differences in tapping HELOC’s. We find no significant effect of financial knowledge 
on changes in HELOC debt.  In Column 8, we use both forms of MEW, i.e., through the first and 
second  mortgages  and  HELOC’s.  Not  surprisingly,  the  sign  on  financial  literacy,  although 16 
 
negative, is insignificant. Much of the impact of financial literacy on MEW appears to operate 
through changes in first and second nonHELOC mortgages as apparent in Columns 1-6.  
Identification  
The estimates in Table 2 may be biased from three potential sources of endogeneity in 
self-reported  financial  literacy.    First,  the  cross-sectional  variation  in  financial  literacy  may 
correlate with underlying differences in risk preferences that affect the propensity to refinance, 
inducing correlation between financial literacy and unobserved heterogeneity,   .  Second, even 
after controlling for risk preferences,  financial literacy may be correlated with the time varying 
error term,    , as households may learn from any experience with mortgage borrowing, leading 
to biased estimates. We address this concern by using an instrumental variables approach.  
Even controlling for many covariates, regression-based estimates of financial literacy on 
MEW may be biased if the functional form is miss-specified or if significant differences in 
covariates exist between the financially literate and illiterate. Invoking a selection on observables 
argument from the program evaluation literature, we use propensity score and nonparametric 
matching methods to estimate the causal effect of financial literacy on MEW propensity.  
Controlling for Risk Preferences 
While time invariance of our financial literacy variable precludes eliminating    in eq. (1) 
using a traditional fixed effects approach, we attempt to deal with it using survey-based measures 
of risk tolerance as a proxy for unobserved heterogeneity and estimate the following model. 
           1      1                                       HomeApprec    
                         13                      ∑         
 
                     0  ,  
(2)
where          are categorical dummies of risk tolerance with          denoting the most risk 
averse and         , the least risk averse and the omitted group. Risk tolerance measures do not 
exist in most datasets, but a unique set of income gambling questions provides controls for this 17 
 
commonly omitted variable.
7 The key identifying assumption is that controlling for risk aversion 
and  other  characteristics,  any  remaining  individual  variation  in  financial  literacy  owes  to 
exogenous factors unrelated to individual choice and unobserved determinants of mortgage debt.  
We  enhance  the  models  in  Table  2  by  including  5  survey-based  measures  of  risk 
aversion.
8 Across columns 1-6 of Table 3, which correspond to columns in Table 2, the financial 
literacy results are stronger and more significant. Price appreciation is no longer significant in 
most models in Table 3, perhaps reflecting that homeowners in states with more variable prices 
could be less risk averse than those elsewhere.  This possibility suggests that the less risk averse 
sort into states with more volatile prices or that higher price appreciation affects risk preferences.  
The statistical significance and coefficient magnitude of the interest rate incentive gain variable 
are very similar to Table 2.  Finally, Garnish is no longer significant in Column 6. Controlling 
for  preference  heterogeneity  in  Table  3  suggests  that  the  financially  literate  are  about  5 
percentage points less likely to withdraw mortgage equity. In columns 7 and 8 of Table 3 MEW 
use is based on changes in debt balances on regular mortgages and HELOC’s. The results are 
very similar to those in Table 2, i.e., almost all of the difference in MEW propensity between 
financially literate and the not so savvy operates through increases in first and second mortgages.   
Addressing Robustness 
We test the sensitivity of our results to including cohort effects, retirement status, health 
status of the respondent and spouse, year effects and state fixed effects. Table 4 includes the 5 
categorical measures of risk aversion in each model.  Since state legal variables are insignificant 
in Column 6 of Table 3, we focus on the robustness of our estimates in Column 5 of Table 3. 
                                                      
7 These measures are based on a set of income gamble questions asking the respondents to choose between a job 
with guaranteed current income and an alternative job with a probability of earning twice their current income with 
an inverse probability of earning half that income. The probabilities of lower income are 1/10, 1/5, 1/3, 1/2, and 3/4. 
Responses are classified into six categories from the least to the most risk averse.   Adding these variables reduced 
the sample size to 1,239 because only a subset of households in the HRS were asked these questions. 
8 Engelhardt and Kumar (2011) use survey measures of risk aversion to control for unobserved  saving preferences. 18 
 
Column 1 in Table 4 is identical to Column 5 in Table 3.   Adding cohort effects in Column 2 
does not notably alter the size or significance of the impact of portfolio literacy.  Columns 3 and 
4 add retirement and health status to control for any correlation they might have with financial 
literacy or MEW propensity. The estimated impact of financial literacy remains stable, although 
significant at the 10% level. Column 5 augments the model with year fixed effects. Since none of 
the cohort, retirement, and heath variables are significant (the p-value on their joint significance 
is 0.71), we drop them in Column 6 and include both year and state fixed effects. Including these 
fixed effects helps control for omitted factors correlated with financial literacy that vary across 
time and space, the latter of which might reflect self-selection effects arising from correlations of 
unobserved preference or other variables with financial literacy.  Although year and state fixed 
effects are jointly significant, the qualitative and quantitative results are basically unchanged. As 
before, the estimated effect of financial literacy is significant at the 5 percent level and lowers 
MEW propensity by 5 percentage points, with little change in the coefficients across the models.
9  
Robustness to Alternative Measures of Financial Literacy 
We have so far used the correct response of the portfolio risk question (LitPortRisk) to 
define financial literacy. To check the sensitivity of the estimated impact of financial literacy on 
MEW propensity to alternative measures of literacy, Table 5 presents results using different 
proxies for financial literacy as the dependent variable with the r.h.s. variables from the model in 
column 6 of Table 4. In column 1, LitPortRisk measures financial literacy. Column 2 and 3 use 
LitCompound and LitMonIllus, respectively. When entered individually, the marginal effect of 
LitCompound is very similar to LitPortRisk, while LitMonIllus in column 3 is insignificant. In 
column 4, we use the total number of correct answers to the three literacy questions, which 
                                                      
9Although our estimates may be sensitive to selection effects from analyzing only homeowners who did not move, 
Hurst and Stafford (2004) found no evidence of selection due to omitting movers in their refinancing model. 19 
 
ranges from 0 to 3. This measure is significant but slightly less than LitPortRisk. Finally, in 
column 5, we instead use a financial literacy index (Fin Lit Index) similar to Van Rooij,  et. al 
(2011)  and  Lusardi  and  Mitchell  (2009),  by  extracting  the  common  factor  from  all  three 
variables. The estimated impact of financial literacy is robust to using this broad measure. 
Despite robustness of our main result to controlling for a rich set of covariates including 
risk preferences, our estimated impact of financially literacy on home equity borrowing may still 
be biased if the individual choice of attaining financial literacy is correlated with other factors 
that are also correlated with borrowing. We use instrumental variable methods to purge our 
estimates of the impact of financial literacy of biases arising from any remaining endogeneity. 
Linear Instrumental Variables Estimates 
Table 6 presents instrumental variable results and to conserve space, shows results only 
using  the  financial  literacy  variable  LitPortRisk.  Panel  A  of  Table  6  provides  instrumental 
variable estimates of a linear probability model of MEW propensity. We use state level average 
high school graduation rates, and the educational attainment of parents as instruments.  Although 
the point estimates are negative, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the impact of financial 
literacy on MEW is not different from zero.  This result is not surprising, as the p-values on the 
significance of our instrument set in the first stage (see the bottom panel), are high, implying that 
the instruments are weak. For the baseline model in column 1, the instruments are significant in 
explaining financial literacy at 10 percent level. However, in richer specifications in columns 2-
6, the instruments have little explanatory power in the first stage, although the overidentification 
test based on the Sargan statistic indicates that the overidentifying restrictions are valid. Given 
insignificant IV coefficients, a Hausman specification test for IV vs. OLS estimation of a linear 
probability model of MEW propensity, fails to reject the null hypothesis of no endogeneity.  20 
 
Hausman and Taylor Models for Panel Data 
To fully exploit the panel nature of our data, we use an alternative instrumental variables 
(IV)  strategy  to  estimate  eq.  (1).  Although,  the  time  invariance  of  our  key  variable,       , 
precludes estimation of fixed effects, we use the “HT” approach of Hausman and Taylor (1981). 
To implement this approach we partition the vector of covariates into four categories based on 
their correlation with the unobserved heterogeneity   : endogenous and exogenous time-varying 
and endogenous and exogenous time constant. RefIncent, LaggedLTV, Dlit, LaggedLiquidAssets, 
and risk tolerance indicators, are considered correlated with   , and hence endogenous. The HT 
strategy entails first estimating coefficients on time-varying covariates by first differencing. The 
coefficients on time constant variables such as financial literacy are then estimated with an IV 
approach by using means of exogenous time-varying variables and time-constant covariates as 
instruments. Results are in panel B of Table 6. Bootstrapped cluster-robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. The coefficients on financial literacy imply that the impact of financial literacy on 
MEW propensity is implausibly high, ranging between -0.42 and -1.29.  Moreover estimates are 
highly imprecise as the HT approach is also susceptible to lack of identification due to a weak 
instruments problem plaguing the linear IV estimates. 
Bivariate Probit Model with Instrumental Variables 
  Two concerns with the simple linear IV strategy and HT approach are that (1) both are 
estimated  using  linear  probability  models  and  (2)  they  are  plagued  with  weak  instruments 
problem. We now specify a Probit equation for financial literacy: 
            1       Φ                                       HomeApprec    
                                                        13                                      ,  
(3)
where   is the vector of instruments excluded from the MEW equation, consisting of state average high 
school graduation rates, father’s educational attainment, and mother’s educational attainment. 21 
 
We  assume  that  composite  error  terms               in  (1)  and  (3),  respectively  have  a  joint 
bivariate normal distribution each with mean zero, variance of one and unknown correlation  . 
Jointly estimating the MEW and financial literacy equations (1 and 3, respectively) in a 
bivariate Probit model may aide identification. Intuitively, in addition to the instruments in the 
financial literacy equation, the nonlinear functional form of such models is an important source 
of  identification.  Unlike  univariate  Probit  models,  bivariate  models  yield  multiple  types  of 
marginal effects on joint, marginal and conditional probabilities. Given our focus on the impact 
of financial literacy on MEW propensity, we present the marginal effects of financial literacy on 
the joint probability of       1 and        0 . Standard errors reported are robust and have 
been clustered at the respondent level. The estimated marginal effect on financial literacy on 
MEW, evaluated at the mean of covariates, is negative, ranging from -0.03 to -0.06 across the 
specifications. Unlike the linear IV specifications in panels A and B, the estimated marginal 
effects are significant across most models and are similar in size to the univariate Probit models.  
Evidence from Matching Estimators 
As  is  well-known  from  the  treatment  effect/program  evaluation  literature  (Heckman, 
Ichimura, and Todd, 1997; Heckman, Lalonde, and Smith, 2000; Imbens, 2004; Abadie and 
Imbens, 2006; Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009), a primary concern with estimating the causal 
impact of financial literacy on MEW propensity is that the linear regression form assumed in 
specifications  (1)  and  (2)  does  not  effectively  adjust  for  significant  differences  in  observed 
characteristics between the financially literate and the illiterate as is apparent from Table 1. 
Further, the linear regression framework is highly sensitive to functional form misspecifications 
that could cloud the estimated impact of financial literacy on MEW propensity. We are primarily 
interested in estimating an overall impact of financial literacy or the average treatment effect 22 
 
(   ) and the impact of financial literacy on     for those who are literate, i.e., average 
treatment effect on the treated (   ). An important focus of our paper is the impact of exposing 
the financially illiterate to financial education programs, i.e., the average treatment effect on the 
untreated (   ). We estimate the three key parameters nonparametrically, using two recently 
adopted types of matching estimators: propensity score matching (see Dahejia and Wahba, 2002; 
and Leuven and Sianesi, 2003) and nearest-neighbor matching (Anadie and Imbens, 2006).  
Without getting into too much technical detail, the qualitative and quantitative results 
reported earlier are robust to using matching estimators.  As discussed in Appendix A, which 
refers  to  Table  7,  the  estimated  effects  of  financial  literacy  on  MEW  propensity  across  all 
specifications are negative and statistically similar to the results from univariate and bivariate 
Probit models. The results are somewhat sensitive to changes in specification but are statistically 
not  different  across  specifications.  In  general  financial  literacy  leads  to  a  decline  in  MEW 
propensity, particularly for the financially illiterate by an average of about 5 percentage points. 
Despite  robustness  and  statistical  significance  of  the  estimated  impact  of  financial 
literacy, there are some caveats. First, the lack of time variation in financial literacy precludes 
comprehensively accounting for unobserved heterogeneity in refinancing. Although we control 
for such heterogeneity with survey-based measures of risk aversion, our estimates could still be 
biased if there is any remaining correlation between financial literacy and unobserved taste for 
mortgage debt. Second, our measure of the increase in the sum of first and second mortgages is 
an imperfect measure of propensity to withdraw housing equity via a mortgage refinancing.  
V. Interpretation and Conclusion 
  During  the  U.S.  mortgage  borrowing  boom  of  1998-2005,  middle-  to  older  age 
households who have more children, are younger, are nonwhite, and are financially illiterate 23 
 
about portfolio risk were more likely to have “actively” withdrawn housing equity via cash-out 
mortgage refinancing or borrowing against traditional second mortgages. Our estimates suggest 
that financially illiterate were about 3 to 5 percentage points more likely to withdraw mortgage 
equity  using  these  means.  The  results  regarding  literacy  accord  with  those  of  Lusardi  and 
Mitchell, who find that literacy with respect to portfolio risk was more linked to suboptimal 
retirement preparation than literacy with respect to numeracy and money illusion based on the 
2002 Health and Retirement Study.   Our results also are consistent with findings from the UK 
(Miles, 2004) and U.S. (Bucks and Pence, 2008) that many households do not fully understand 
important characteristics of their mortgages. Our results loosely accord with those of Lusardi and 
Tufano  (2009)  and  Stango  and  Zinman  (2008),  who  find  that  illiteracy  is  linked  to  over-
borrowing and under-accumulation of wealth.   
Nevertheless, those latter studies defined literacy with respect to numeracy. We find that 
literacy based on computational questions involving compound interest or money illusion was 
insignificantly related to MEW activity when all three measures of financial sophistication were 
included  in  the  specification.    However,  literacy  in  terms  of  understanding  basic  portfolio 
diversification was significant. Aside from our use of a smaller sample, there is a plausible 
explanation for this apparent difference in findings with respect to Lusardi and Tufano (2008) 
and Stango and Zinman (2008).  First, they assess financial behavior in quantitative terms, where 
computational literacy would, a priori, seem to matter.  In contrast, our probit models assess 
whether or not a household withdraws any housing equity at all.  For such a binary decision, 
basic financial sense rather than numeracy could plausibly matter more.  Although our data do 
not allow us to examine the propensity to refinance (we only observe the change in the amount 
of mortgage debt, not the interest rate or date of origination), our findings illustrate that mortgage 24 
 
borrowing is affected by illiteracy.  In this loose sense, our results are not inconsistent with 
Campbell’s (2006) hypothesis that financial literacy contributed to his finding that many people 
did not refinance their mortgages when lower interest rates could have saved on borrowing costs.  
We also find that households are more likely to withdraw housing equity in states where 
the legal code and culture make lenders less able to collect from bankrupt borrowers, consistent 
with  Lefgren  and  McIntyre’s  (2009)  emphasis  that  legal  differences  across  states  can  help 
explain borrowing behavior.  This suggests that MEW activity differs across states not only due 
to differences in house price appreciation rates, but also to differences in bankruptcy codes.   
  This study’s findings also have at least two public policy implications.  First, during the 
U.S.  mortgage  boom  of  the  late  1990s  and  early  2000’s,  financial  illiteracy  contributed  to 
mortgage equity withdrawals that increased household debt.  Given the macro implications of 
mortgage equity withdrawals for consumption during the recent boom and bust, as well as the 
micro  implications  for  optimal  behavior  for  individual  households,  this  finding  suggests  a 
possible role for public policy to improve financial literacy and make mortgage information 
disclosure  more  understandable  and  accessible  to  the  general  public.    Second,  although 
redressing mathematical illiteracy among adults is difficult, the stronger link of MEW behavior 
with  portfolio  literacy  than  with  numeracy  offers  hope  that  financial  education  might  help 
prevent  suboptimal  borrowing.    Nevertheless,  designing effective education programs entails 
dealing  with  a  number  of  factors  (e.g.,  more  intensive  lender  screening  and  even  cognitive 
decline over the life-cycle) as stressed by Agarwal et al. (2009) and Agarwal et al. (2010). 
   25 
 
References 
Abadie, Alberto, and Imbens, Guido W., (2006), “Large sample properties of matching 
estimators for  average treatment effects,” Econometrica 74 (1), 235–267 January. 
Agarwal, Sumit (2007), “The Impact of Homeowners’ Housing Wealth Misestimation on 
Consumption and Saving Decisions,” Real Estate Economics 35, 135-54. 
Agarwal, Sumit, Amromin, Gene, Ben-David, Itzhak, Chomsisengphet, Souphala, and Evanoff, 
Douglas  D.,  (2010),  “Learning  to  Cope:  Voluntary  Financial  Education  and  Loan 
Performance  during  a  Housing  Crisis,”  American Economic Review: Papers and 
Proceedings 100 (May), 495-500.  
Agarwal, Sumit, Driscoll, John C., Gabaix, Xavier, and Laibson, David (2009), “The Age of 
Reason:  Financial  Decisions  Over  the  Life-Cycle  with  Implications  for  Regulation,” 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity Fall, 51-117. 
Aron, Janine, Duca, John, Muellbauer, John, Murata, Keiko, and Murphy, Anthony (2011) 
“Credit, Housing Collateral and Consumption: Evidence from the UK, Japan, and the 
U.S.,” forthcoming, Review of Income and Wealth. 
All Foreclosure, <http://www.all-foreclosure.com/procedures.htm>.  
Benito, Andrew (2009), “Who Withdraws Housing Equity and Why?” Economica 76, 51-70. 
Bernheim, D., D. Garrett, and D. Maki (2001), “Education and saving: The long-term effects of 
high school financial curriculum mandates,” Journal of Public Economics, 85, 435-565. 
Bernheim, D., and D. Garrett (2003), “The effects of financial education in the workplace: 
Evidence from a survey of households,” Journal of Public Economics, 87, 1487-1519. 
Browning, M., Gortz, M., and Leth-Petersen, S. (2008), “House Prices and Consumption: A 
  Micro Study,” unpublished manuscript, Nuffield College, Oxford University. 26 
 
Bucks, Brian and Pence, Karen (2008), “Do Borrowers Know Their Mortgage Terms?” Journal 
  of Urban Economics 64, 218-33. 
Campbell, John Y. (2006), “Household Finance,” Journal of Finance 61, 1553-1604. 
Canner, Glenn, Dynan, Karen. and Passmore,Wayne (2002), “Mortgage Refinancing in 2001 
  and Early 2002,” Federal Reserve Bulletin 88, 469–81. 
Carroll, C., and Kimball, M. (2005), “Liquidity Constraints and Precautionary Saving,”  
manuscript, Johns Hopkins University, 
<http://econ.jhu.edu/people/ccarroll/papers/liquidRevised.pdf> . 
Carroll,  Christopher.,  Otsuka,  Misuzu.,  Slacalek,  Jiri  (2011),  “How  Large  Are  Housing  and 
Financial Wealth Effects? A New Approach," Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 
43(1), 55-79. 
Cole,  Shawn,  and  Gauri  Kartini  Shastry  (2009),  “Smart  Money:  The  Effect  of  Education, 
Cognitive Ability, and Financial Literacy on Financial Market Participation.” Harvard 
Business School Working Paper n. 09-071. 
Dehejia, R.H. and S. Wahba (2002) “Propensity Score Matching Methods for Non-Experimental 
Causal Studies,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 84(1), 151-161. 
Dohmen, Thomas, Armin Falk, David Huffman, and Uwe Sunde. 2010. "Are Risk Aversion and 
Impatience Related to Cognitive Ability?" American Economic Review, 100(3): 1238–60. 
Duca, John V. (2006), “Mutual Funds and the Evolving Long-Run Effects of Stock Wealth on 
U.S. Consumption” The Journal of Economics and Business 58, 202-221. 
Duca,  John  V.,  Muellbauer,  John,  and  Murphy,  Anthony  (2010),  “Housing  Markets  and  the 
Financial Crisis of 2007-2009: Lessons for the Future,” Journal of Financial Stability 
6(4), 203-17. 27 
 
Duca, John V. and Rosenthal, Stuart S. (1993), “Borrowing Constraints, Household Debt, and 
Racial Discrimination in Loan Markets,” Journal of Financial Intermediation 3, 77-103. 
Engelhardt, Gary V. (1996), “Consumption, Down Payments and Liquidity Constraints,” Journal 
of Money Credit and Banking 28 (2), 255-71.  
Engelhardt, Gary V. and Kumar, Anil (2011), "Pensions and Household Wealth Accumulation,"  
  Journal of Human Resources 46(1), 203-36. 
Ferreira, Fernando, Gyourko, Joseph, and Tracy, Joseph (2010), “Housing Busts and Household 
Mobility,” Journal of Urban Economics 68, 34-45. 
Greenspan,  Alan  and  Kennedy,  James  (2008),  “Sources  and  Uses  of  Equity  Extracted  from 
Homes,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 24 (1), 120-44. 
Heckman, J.J., Ichimura, H. and Todd, P.E. (1997), "Matching As An Econometric Evaluation 
Estimator: Evidence from Evaluating a Job Training Programme," Review of Economic 
Studies 64, 605-654. 
Heckman, J.J., LaLonde, R.J., Smith, J.A. (1998), "The Economics and Econometrics of Active 
Labour Market Programmes", in Ashenfelter, O. and Card, D. (eds.), The Handbook of 
Labour Economics Vol.3A. 
Hurst, Erik. and Stafford, Frank (2004), “Home Is Where the Equity Is: Mortgage Refinancing 
and Household Consumption,” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 36 (6), 985–1014. 
Imbens, Guido W.(2004), “Nonparametric estimation of average treatment effects under  
  exogeneity: a review,” Review of Economics and Statistics 86 (1), 4–29 February. 
Imbens, Guido W., and Jeffrey M. Wooldridge. 2009. "Recent Developments in the  
  Econometrics of Program Evaluation." Journal of Economic Literature, 47(1): 5–86. 
Lefgren, Lars, and McIntyre, Frank (2009), “Explaining the Puzzle of Cross-State Differences in 
Bankruptcy Rates,” Journal of Law and Economics 52, 367-93. 28 
 
Legal Consumer  <http://www.legalconsumer.com/bankruptcy/laws/>.. 
Lehnert, Andreas, and Maki, Dean M. (2007), ''Consumption, Debt, and Portfolio Choice:  
Testing the Effects of Bankruptcy Law,'' in Sumit Agarwal and Brent Ambrose, eds., 
Financial Instruments for Households: Credit Usage from Mortgages to Credit Cards. 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Leuven E. and Sianesi B. (2003), "PSMATCH2: Stata module to perform full Mahalanobis and  
propensity score matching, common support graphing, and covariate imbalance testing". 
http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s432001.html. Version 1.2.3. 
Lusardi, Annamarie, and Mitchell, Olivia (2006), “Financial Literacy and Planning: Implications 
  for Retirement Wellbeing,” Working paper 2006-1, Pension Research Council. 
Lusardi, Annamarie, and Mitchell, Olivia (2007), “Baby Boomer Retirement Security: The Roles 
of Planning, Financial Literacy, and Housing Wealth,” Journal of Monetary Economics 
54, 205–224. 
Lusardi, Anna Maria and Olivia Mitchell, 2009. “How Ordinary Consumers Make Complex    
Economic  Decisions:  Financial  Literacy  and  Retirement  Readiness,”  Mimeo  Wharton 
School. 
Lusardi, Annamarie, and Tufano, Peter (2009), “Debt Literacy, Financial Experiences, and  
  Overindebtedness,” working paper, Dartmouth College. 
Mian, Atif, amd Sufi, Mian (2010), “House Prices, Home Equity-Based Borrowing, and the 
U.S. Household Leverage Crisis,” American Economic Review, forthcoming. 
Miles, David (1992), “Housing Markets, Consumption, and Financial Liberalization,” European  
 Economic  Review  36, 1093-1136. 29 
 
Miles, David (2004), “The UK Mortgage Market: Taking a Longer-TermView,” working paper, 
UK Treasury. 
Muellbauer, John, and Lattimore, Richard (1995), “The Consumption Function: a Theoretical 
and Empirical Overview,” in Pesaran, H. and Wickens, M. (Eds.), Handbook of Applied 
Econometrics, Blackwell.  
Muellbauer,  John  and,  Murphy,  Anthony  (1997),  “Booms  and  Busts  in  the  U.K.  Housing 
Market,” The Economic Journal 107, 1701–27. 
Rosenbaum,  P.R.  and  Rubin,  D.B.  (1983),  “The  Central  Role  of  the  Propensity  Score  in 
Observational Studies for Causal Effects,” Biometrika, 70, 1, 41-55. 
Stango,  Victor  and,  Zinman,  Jonathan  (2008),  “Exponential  Growth  Bias  and  Household 
Finance,” working paper, Dartmouth College. 
van Rooij, Maarten, Lusardi, Annamaria, and Alessie, Rob (2011). “Financial literacy and stock 
market participation,” Journal of Financial Economics, 
doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.03.006 
Woodward, Susan E, and Hall, Robert E., (2010), “Consumer Confusion in the Mortgage 
Market: Evidence of Less than a Perfect Transparent and Competitive Market,” American 
Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 100 (May), 511-16.  
  30 
 
Appendix A: Evidence from Matching Estimators 
We focus on estimating the overall impact of financial literacy or the average treatment 
effect (   ) and the impact of financial literacy on     for those who are literate, i.e., average 
treatment effect on the treated (    ). An important goal of our paper is gauging the impact of 
exposing financially illiterate to financial education programs, i.e., the average treatment effect 
on the untreated (   ). We estimate the three key parameters nonparametrically, using two 
recently adopted types of matching estimators: propensity score matching (Dahejia and Wahba, 
2002, Leuven and Sianesi, 2003) and nearest-neighbor matching (Anadie and Imbens, 2006).  
  Denoting the MEW propensity of a financially literate respondent   as      and 
that of a financially illiterate respondent as      , and denoting   . , the expectation operator, 
we estimate ATE, ATT, and      conditional on other covariates     , using the following:  
      :        |                   |       (4)
      :        |       1 ,                   |       1 ,         (5)
      :        |       0 ,                   |       0 ,         (6)
Averaging over all values ofX, gives an estimate of ATE, ATT, and    . Noting that the missing 
counterfactual, E MEW  |Dlit   1 ,X    in (5), is unobserved for a financially literate respondent, 
we  find  the  closest  match  among  the  financially  literate  based  on  covariates.  An  analogous 
matching strategy is used to construct the missing counterfactual E MEW  |Dlit   0 ,X    in (6). 
Comparing the MEW propensity between a respondent and the closest match from the opposite 
treatment and averaging over the sample provides consistent estimates of ATT and  ATU.  
As explained in Abadie and Imbens (2006), two assumptions are required for consistency 
of     :    unconfoundedness  and  overlap.    Unconfoundedness,  also  known  as  selection  on 
observables or conditional independence, requires that the treatment, i.e., financial literacy      , 
is independent of the two potential outcomes       and      , conditional on covariates  . 31 
 
The unconfoundedness condition is weaker for the identification of     as the only requirement 
is  that  treatment         be  independent  of  the  no  treatment  outcome       .  The  overlap 
condition requires that  0                 1 |    1  ,i.e., there must be financially literate as 
well illiterate at all possible values of covariates vector   so that an appropriate match for the 
financially literate can be constructed at each value   of   from the control group, i.e., the 
illiterate and vice-versa. For identifying    , this condition weakens to             1 |    1 . 
We first construct an appropriate match using the nearest neighbor approach proposed in 
Abadie and Imbens (2006). Let   be the number of respondents in the control group forming a 
set  of  possible  candidates,     ,  for  being  closest,  in  covariates      based  on  an  appropriate 
distance measure, to the     member of the treatment group. Denote  ,  ,    as the numbers of 
the  overall  sample,  the  treatment  group  and  the  control  group,  respectively.
10  An  estimate 
         for the financially literate is constructed from the observed indicator MEW   as follows: 
          
1
M
 M E W  
  SM 
if Dlit   1   (7)
Analogously, the counterfactual          for the financially illiterate is constructed as: 
          
1
M
 M E W  
  SM 
if Dlit   0   (8)
Then as shown in Abadie and Imbens (2006), an estimator of     can be written as: 
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      (9)
    is the frequency respondent   is chosen as a match. Analogously, an estimator for     is: 
                                                      
10 The distance metric used to match a unit   with covariate vector    with another with vector    is the vector norm 
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An estimate of     is obtained exactly analogously to the    : 
       
1
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(11)
As shown in Abadie and Imbens (2006), the estimators      ,     ,      are unbiased only if 
matching is exact, which is plausible in case the covariates are discrete. The larger the number of 
continuous covariates, the more difficult it is to find exact matches and the estimators are biased 
with bias of the order   
 
    where k is the number of continuous covariates. 
  Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) showed that if unconfoundedness holds, adjusting for the 
propensity score                            1 |        rather than an entire set of covariates  , is 
sufficient.  This motivates a matching estimator that can be constructed by matching on a single 
variable (i.e., the propensity score,     ), which reduces  both the “curse of dimensionality” 
from matching on an entire vector   and the asymptotic bias. Since the true propensity score of 
financial  literacy  is  unknown,  it  is  estimated  from  a  standard  Probit  or  Logit  model.  Using 
estimated  propensity  scores,  counterfactuals  in  (7)  and  (8)  can  be  constructed  based  on  the 
nearest neighbor method by comparing the propensity scores and then      ,     ,      can be 
estimated as in (9), (10), and (11), with the standard errors corrected for first stage estimation. 
We use both propensity score matching and nearest neighbor matching to estimate the 
impact of financial literacy on MEW propensity. We report cluster-bootstrapped standard errors 
for the propensity score-based matching estimates.  We calculate the bias-adjusted estimates and 
appropriate standard errors for nearest-neighbor matching based on entire set of covariates   
using the methods suggested in Abadie and Imbens (2006). Results are presented in Table 7. 
Columns 1-3 present results from propensity score matching while columns 4-6 contain results 33 
 
from  nearest  neighbor  matching  using  covariates.    All  estimated  effects  in  the  table  are 
calculated by using one closest match to estimate the missing counterfactual for each respondent 
in the sample. Estimates based on just one match, reduce bias but can be imprecise. Therefore we 
also estimated all effects using two, three and four closest matches.  The results were very 
similar and therefore we present results using just one match. The estimated effects across all 
specifications are negative and statistically similar to the results from univariate and bivariate 
Probit models. The results are somewhat sensitive to changes in specification but are statistically 
not different across specifications. Comparing estimates in column 1 and column 4, which are 
from the baseline specification, reveals that the ATE and ATU are significant when propensity 
score matching is used. However, when risk aversion categories are included in the covariate set, 
in column 2 and 4, ATE and ATU, are significant when nearest neighbor matching is used, but 
insignificant  with  propensity  score  matching.  The  estimates  are  neither  statistically  different 
across matching methods nor across specifications. In the richest specification in columns 3 and 
6, most effects are insignificant except the ATU in column 6. Table 7 suggests that the impact of 
financial literacy on the MEW behavior of the control group, i.e., those who are financially 
illiterate, are larger than the overall ATE or the ATT which applies to the finically literate. The 
nearest-neighbor estimates in column 6 indicates that financial literacy among the those who are 
financially illiterate would reduce the likelihood of MEW by 10 percentage points, although 
across specifications this effect ranges from 3 to 10 percentage points. The precision of the 
estimates  is  affected  by  smaller  sample  size  in  richer  specifications.  However,  the  overall 
evidence from Table 7 is unmistakable; in general financial literacy leads to a decline in MEW 
propensity, particularly for the financially illiterate by an average of about 5 percentage points. 
 34 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
  LitPortRisk=0 LitPortRisk=1 Overall 
Whether Wihdrew Equity .171  .159  .166 
MEW Amount  7622.496  8518.272  8209.268 
  (33571.98)  (33728.3)  (33601.28) 
  [0]  [0]  [0] 
RefIncent  .085  .154  .125 
  (.277)  (1.012)  (.804) 
  [0]  [0]  [0] 
HomeApprec  .234  .234  .235 
  (.155)  (.157)  (.156) 
  [.177]  [.183]  [.179] 
Garnish  .777  .76  .767 
  (.202)  (.214)  (.209) 
  [.75]  [.75]  [.75] 
Judicial  .496  .517  .505 
  (.462)  (.461)  (.462) 
  [.5]  [.5]  [.5] 
Deficiency  .728  .715  .716 
  (.445)  (.451)  (.451) 
  [1]  [1]  [1] 
Chap13Share  .283  .272  .276 
  (.138)  (.138)  (.137) 
  [.28]  [.25]  [.28] 
Unemp   .007  .014  .011 
Age  65.446  62.213  63.523 
  (10.939)  (9.634)  (10.276) 
  [64]  [60]  [62] 
HSchoolGrad  .355  .316  .329 
SomeCollege  .252  .247  .247 
CollegeGrad  .178  .345  .281 
Male  .357  .474  .431 
White  .859  .923  .897 
NumChildren  3.304  2.716  2.956 
  (2.107)  (1.749)  (1.924) 
  [3]  [2]  [3] 
 
Note: Only means are presented for dummy variables. Standard errors in 
parentheses; median in square brackets. Estimates have been weighted by HRS 
household weights. 35 
 
Table 2: Marginal Effects from Probit Models of Whether Households Withdrew Housing Equity 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
MEW Channel  Mortgage  Mortgage  Mortgage  Mortgage  Mortgage  Mortgage  HELOC  Mortgage+HELOC 
LitPortRisk    -0.037**  -0.032**  -0.029*  -0.029**  -0.026*  0.012  -0.016 
    (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.011)  (0.017) 
           
LitCompound    0.001             
    (0.017)             
           
LitMonIllus    0.022             
    (0.019)             
           
RefIncent  0.093**  0.093**  0.096**  0.091**  0.041**  0.041**  -0.000  0.056** 
  (0.020)  (0.019)  (0.020)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.018)  (0.002)  (0.023) 
           
HomeApprec  0.084*  0.069  0.080*  0.077*  0.080**  0.101**  0.026  0.103** 
  (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.040)  (0.038)  (0.039)  (0.031)  (0.049) 
           
Age  -0.007**  -0.007**  -0.007**  -0.006**  -0.004**  -0.004**  -0.002**  -0.006** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
           
HSchoolGrad  0.028  0.035  0.032  0.032  0.032  0.038*  0.039**  0.053** 
  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.023)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.019)  (0.026) 
           
SomeCollege  0.029  0.038  0.033  0.037  0.030  0.034  0.041*  0.056* 
  (0.029)  (0.030)  (0.029)  (0.028)  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.024)  (0.032) 
           
CollegeGrad  0.016  0.026  0.022  0.038  0.036  0.040  0.058**  0.063** 
  (0.027)  (0.028)  (0.027)  (0.028)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.028)  (0.034) 
           
Male  0.022  0.021  0.021  0.019  0.020  0.020  0.004  0.012 
  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.011)  (0.017) 
           
White  -0.083**  -0.082**  -0.075**  -0.062**  -0.056**  -0.047**  -0.004  -0.043* 
  (0.026)  (0.027)  (0.026)  (0.025)  (0.023)  (0.022)  (0.017)  (0.026) 
           
NumChildren  0.016**  0.014**  0.015**  0.013**  0.011**  0.011**  0.002  0.015** 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.004) 
           
Married  -0.015  -0.014  -0.014  -0.009  -0.001  0.002  0.011  0.006 
  (0.020)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.018)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.013)  (0.020) 36 
 
           
Unemp        0.071  0.071  0.078  -0.004  0.086 
        (0.080)  (0.083)  (0.084)  (0.046)  (0.100) 
           
LaggedLiquidAssets        -0.000**  -0.000**  -0.000**  -0.000  -0.000 
        (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
           
LaggedLTV          0.167**  0.164**  0.031*  0.165** 
          (0.028)  (0.027)  (0.017)  (0.033) 
           
MeanIncome          -0.000  -0.000  0.000*  0.000 
          (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
           
Garnish            0.051  0.016  0.066 
            (0.035)  (0.029)  (0.043) 
           
Chap13Share            0.116**  -0.092**  0.028 
            (0.051)  (0.040)  (0.063) 
Observations  2447  2400  2433  2433  2432  2432  2425  2425 
Pseudo-R-Sq  0.08  0.09  0.09  0.09  0.12  0.13  0.06  0.10 
Note: The dependent variable is whether the household withdrew housing equity. The Standard errors presented in parentheses are based on robust standard errors  
clustered by households. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05 
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Table 3: Marginal Effects from Probit Models of Whether Households Withdrew Housing Equity  
(Controlling for Risk Aversion) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
MEW Channel  Mortgage  Mortgage  Mortgage  Mortgage  Mortgage  Mortgage  HELOC  Mortgage+HELOC 
LitPortRisk    -0.056**  -0.060**  -0.060**  -0.059**  -0.054**  0.012  -0.040 
    (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.018)  (0.028) 
           
LitCompound    -0.024             
    (0.028)             
           
LitMonIllus    0.010             
    (0.029)             
           
RefIncent  0.104**  0.106**  0.104**  0.103**  0.048*  0.049*  -0.003  0.061* 
  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.029)  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.003)  (0.036) 
           
HomeApprec  0.074  0.061  0.065  0.067  0.072  0.106*  0.039  0.085 
  (0.063)  (0.062)  (0.062)  (0.061)  (0.060)  (0.062)  (0.048)  (0.073) 
           
Age  -0.007**  -0.007**  -0.007**  -0.006**  -0.005**  -0.005**  -0.002**  -0.008** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
           
HSchoolGrad  0.029  0.031  0.039  0.040  0.034  0.038  0.048*  0.048 
  (0.037)  (0.036)  (0.036)  (0.036)  (0.034)  (0.035)  (0.030)  (0.040) 
           
SomeCollege  0.048  0.048  0.052  0.053  0.042  0.041  0.021  0.032 
  (0.047)  (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.033)  (0.049) 
           
CollegeGrad  0.010  0.022  0.024  0.032  0.020  0.020  0.045  0.025 
  (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.041)  (0.039)  (0.039)  (0.036)  (0.046) 
           
Male  0.037  0.044*  0.039*  0.037*  0.034  0.034  -0.006  0.021 
  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.022)  (0.021)  (0.016)  (0.027) 
           
White  -0.092**  -0.080**  -0.083**  -0.078**  -0.078**  -0.065**  0.010  -0.036 
  (0.036)  (0.036)  (0.035)  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.033)  (0.024)  (0.038) 
           
NumChildren  0.022**  0.020**  0.021**  0.020**  0.017**  0.017**  0.004  0.021** 
  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.007) 
           
Married  0.019  0.021  0.028  0.031  0.030  0.032  0.027  0.038 38 
 
  (0.028)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.025)  (0.020)  (0.031) 
           
Rrisk2  0.039  0.038  0.038  0.042  0.026  0.017  -0.062*  -0.023 
  (0.066)  (0.066)  (0.067)  (0.068)  (0.064)  (0.064)  (0.022)  (0.066) 
           
Rrisk4  -0.086*  -0.097**  -0.099**  -0.098**  -0.096**  -0.099**  -0.037  -0.113* 
  (0.037)  (0.032)  (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.033)  (0.047) 
           
Rrisk4  -0.034  -0.037  -0.041  -0.041  -0.044  -0.048  -0.039  -0.051 
  (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.042)  (0.041)  (0.042)  (0.031)  (0.054) 
           
Rrisk5  -0.053  -0.062  -0.060  -0.060  -0.059  -0.066  -0.043  -0.080 
  (0.042)  (0.040)  (0.041)  (0.041)  (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.031)  (0.051) 
           
Rrisk6  -0.055  -0.067  -0.068  -0.067  -0.070  -0.075  -0.077**  -0.105* 
  (0.045)  (0.044)  (0.045)  (0.044)  (0.044)  (0.046)  (0.036)  (0.054) 
           
Unemp        0.022  0.021  0.027  0.015  0.044 
        (0.087)  (0.086)  (0.085)  (0.072)  (0.109) 
           
LaggedLiquidAssets        -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
        (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
           
LaggedLTV          0.139**  0.133**  0.027  0.115** 
          (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.027)  (0.048) 
           
MeanIncome          0.000  0.000  0.000*  0.000 
          (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
           
Garnish            0.027  0.024  0.052 
            (0.057)  (0.050)  (0.071) 
           
Chap13Share            0.179**  -0.119*  0.054 
            (0.087)  (0.067)  (0.107) 
Observations  1245  1235  1240  1240  1239  1239  1237  1237 
Pseudo-R-Sq  0.09  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.11  0.11  0.06  0.09 
The dependent variable is whether the household withdrew housing equity. The Standard errors presented in parentheses are based on robust standard  
errors clustered by households.  The variables rrisk2-rrisk6 are the five categories of risk aversion with increasing degree of risk aversion; rrisk1, i.e., 
     least risk averse, is the omitted category. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05 
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Table 4: Marginal Effects from Probit Models of Whether Households Withdrew Housing Equity  
(Robustness to Covariates) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
LitPortRisk  -0.059**  -0.058**  -0.058**  -0.049*  -0.047*  -0.059** 
  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.023) 
        
RefIncent  0.048*  0.045  0.045  0.035  0.014**  0.017 
  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.030)  (0.004)  (0.012) 
        
HomeApprec  0.072  0.067  0.068  0.115*  0.111  0.138 
  (0.060)  (0.060)  (0.060)  (0.069)  (0.070)  (0.120) 
        
Age  -0.005**  -0.003  -0.003  -0.002  -0.004  -0.005** 
  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.001) 
        
HSchoolGrad  0.034  0.032  0.031  0.043  0.044  0.029 
  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.041)  (0.040)  (0.035) 
        
SomeCollege  0.042  0.035  0.034  0.029  0.030  0.033 
  (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.048)  (0.048)  (0.043) 
        
CollegeGrad  0.020  0.015  0.015  -0.007  -0.003  0.018 
  (0.039)  (0.039)  (0.039)  (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.041) 
        
Male  0.034  0.034  0.033  0.053**  0.056**  0.029 
  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.021)  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.022) 
        
White  -0.078**  -0.082**  -0.083**  -0.084**  -0.084**  -0.065** 
  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.042)  (0.041)  (0.033) 
        
NumChildren  0.017**  0.017**  0.017**  0.023**  0.022**  0.019** 
  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.006) 
        
Married  0.030  0.031  0.031  0.072  0.076  0.030 
  (0.026)  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.039)  (0.037)  (0.026) 
        
Unemp  0.021  0.016  0.013  -0.067  -0.067  0.038 
  (0.086)  (0.084)  (0.083)  (0.067)  (0.065)  (0.094) 
        
LaggedLiquidAssets  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 40 
 
        
LaggedLTV  0.139**  0.137**  0.136**  0.136**  0.148**  0.148** 
  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.045)  (0.041)  (0.037) 
        
MeanIncome  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
        
Rrisk2  0.026  0.026  0.027  -0.021  -0.022  0.002 
  (0.064)  (0.063)  (0.063)  (0.051)  (0.050)  (0.061) 
        
Rrisk4  -0.096**  -0.097**  -0.096**  -0.126**  -0.123**  -0.101** 
  (0.032)  (0.031)  (0.032)  (0.029)  (0.028)  (0.031) 
        
Rrisk4  -0.044  -0.046  -0.046  -0.087**  -0.086**  -0.060 
  (0.041)  (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.036)  (0.035)  (0.039) 
        
Rrisk5  -0.059  -0.059  -0.060  -0.096**  -0.096**  -0.074* 
  (0.040)  (0.039)  (0.039)  (0.036)  (0.035)  (0.038) 
        
Rrisk6  -0.070  -0.072  -0.071  -0.123**  -0.122**  -0.090* 
  (0.044)  (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.042)  (0.041)  (0.044) 
        
year effects  No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
        
state effects  No  No  No  No  No  Yes 
        
cohort effects  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
        
retired status  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
        
health status  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  No 
Observations  1239  1239  1239  971  971  1203 
Pseudo-R-Sq  0.11  0.11  0.11  0.11  0.12  0.13 
Note: The dependent variable is whether the household withdrew housing equity as measured by whether 
or not mortgage debt increased. The Standard errors presented in parentheses are based on robust standard 
errors clustered by households.  Refer to Table 2 and 3 for risk aversion categories. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05 
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Table 5: Marginal Effects from Probit Models of Whether Households Withdrew Housing Equity  
(Robustness to Measures of Financial Literacy) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Measure of Financial Literacy  LitPortRisk  LitCompound  LitMonIllus  # Correct  Fin Lit Index 
          
Effect of Financial Literacy  -0.059**  -0.053*  -0.006  -0.032**  -0.037** 
  (0.023)  (0.029)  (0.030)  (0.014)  (0.019) 
          
RefIncent  0.017  0.018  0.015**  0.016**  0.015** 
  (0.012)  (0.015)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.007) 
          
HomeApprec  0.138  0.122  0.100  0.118  0.115 
  (0.120)  (0.121)  (0.120)  (0.120)  (0.120) 
          
Age  -0.005**  -0.006**  -0.006**  -0.006**  -0.006** 
  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
          
HSchoolGrad  0.029  0.012  0.015  0.016  0.014 
  (0.035)  (0.034)  (0.035)  (0.034)  (0.034) 
          
SomeCollege  0.033  0.023  0.023  0.030  0.028 
  (0.043)  (0.042)  (0.042)  (0.042)  (0.042) 
          
CollegeGrad  0.018  0.005  0.007  0.014  0.010 
  (0.041)  (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.040) 
          
Male  0.029  0.037  0.032  0.035  0.033 
  (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.022)  (0.022) 
          
White  -0.065**  -0.060*  -0.072**  -0.056*  -0.060* 
  (0.033)  (0.035)  (0.036)  (0.035)  (0.035) 
          
NumChildren  0.019**  0.020**  0.020**  0.019**  0.019** 
  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
          
Married  0.030  0.011  0.012  0.023  0.023 
  (0.026)  (0.029)  (0.028)  (0.027)  (0.027) 
          
Unemp  0.038  0.016  0.024  0.019  0.017 
  (0.094)  (0.084)  (0.088)  (0.086)  (0.085) 
          42 
 
LaggedLiquidAssets  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
          
LaggedLTV  0.148**  0.158**  0.157**  0.153**  0.153** 
  (0.037)  (0.036)  (0.035)  (0.037)  (0.037) 
          
MeanIncome  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
          
Risk Aversion  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
          
year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
          
state effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  1203  1206  1203  1198  1198 
Pseudo-R-Sq  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.14  0.13 
Note: The dependent variable is whether the household withdrew housing equity as measured by whether or not mortgage 
debt increased. The Standard errors presented in parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by households.  
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Table 6: Instrumental Variable Estimates of Impact of Financial Literacy on Mortgage 
Equity Withdrawal (MEW) Propensity 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
A. Linear Instrumental Variables 
Coefficient on LitPortRisk  -0.002  -0.369  -0.392  -0.398  -0.359  -0.361 
  (0.113) (0.261) (0.267)  (0.275)  (0.279) (0.277)
         
B. Hausman and Taylor Model 
Coefficient LitPortRisk  -0.821  -1.082  -1.292  -0.912  -0.429  -0.181 
  (1.313) (1.228) (0.876)  (0.644)  (0.371) (0.355)
         
         
C. Marginal Effects from Bivariate Probit with Instruments 
On Prob(LitPortRisk=1,MEW=1) -0.036  -0.062  -0.062  -0.062  -0.055  -0.052 
  (0.048) (0.008) (0.008)  (0.0080) (0.010) (0.009)
         
         
Controls         
Risk Aversion  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
year effects  No  No  No  No  No  Yes 
cohort effects  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
retired status  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
health status  No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Observations  2432  1239  1239  1239  971  971 
P-value on Overid Test  0.066  0.215  0.269  0.283  0.148  0.152 
P-value on IV in first stage  0.074  0.646  0.613  0.634  0.722  0.722 
P-value on Hausman Test  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000 
Note: The dependent variable for linear IV and Hausman and Taylor models is a dummy for whether the household 
withdrew housing equity as measured by whether or not mortgage debt increased. Average state level high school 
graduation rate and parent's education categories were used as instruments in the Linear IV and Bivariate probit 
models. In the Hausman and Taylor means of other exogenous variables were used as instruments in addition to 
Average state level high school graduation rate and parent's education categories. In Bivariate Probit, the two 
equations estimated jointly are for financial literacy indicator and whether the household withdrew housing equity 
as measured by whether or not mortgage debt increased.  The standard errors presented in parentheses are based on 
robust standard errors clustered by households.  44 
 
Table 7: Estimates of the impact of financial literacy on Mortgage Equity 
Withdrawal (MEW) propensity based on matching estimation methods 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
        
ATE  -0.040  -0.019  -0.006  -0.023  -0.055  -0.023 
  (0.018) (0.026) (0.032) (0.017)  (0.025) (0.026)
        
ATT  -0.034  0.004  0.019  -0.013  -0.039  0.025 
  (0.022) (0.033) (0.041) (0.019)  (0.029) (0.028)
        
ATU  -0.047  -0.053  -0.048  -0.034  -0.080  -0.11 
  (0.025) (0.036) (0.043) (0.022)  (0.029) (0.031)
        
Controls        
        
Risk Aversion  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year effects  No  No  No  No  No  Yes 
Cohort effects  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Retired status  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Health status  No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes 
N  2432  1239  971  2432  1239  971 
Matching Method PS  PS  PS  NN  NN  NN 
Note: The numbers in the table refer to the estimates of the impact of financial literacy on 
mortgage equity withdrawal (MEW) propensity as measured by whether or not mortgage 
debt increased. ATE is overall average treatment effect of financial literacy. ATT is the 
impact  of  financial  literacy  on  MEW  of  those  who  are  literate.    ATU  is  the  impact  of 
financial literacy on MEW of those who are financially illiterate. PS stands for propensity 
score  matching.  Standard  errors  presented  in  parenthesis  are  corrected  for  estimated 
propensity score by calculating bootstrapped standard errors clustered by respondents based 
on 100 replications. NN denotes nearest neighbor matching on full set of covariates using the 
bias-adjusted  estimation  method  proposed  in  Abadie  and  Imbens  (2006).  All  estimated 
effects in the table were obtained by computing the missing counterfactual using one nearest 
neighbor. Estimates using two, three, and four neighbors were very similar. 
 
 
 